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vs.
Argument Priorty
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ALLEN R. WATTS,
Defendant - Appellant,
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Should the District Court have suppressed the Marijuana

seized on or about September 16, 1985 and other evidence derived
from such seizure pursuant to Section 77-35-12 of the Utah Code
of Criminal Procedure in that such search and seizure was in
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution.
II.

Should the District Court have supressed all marijuana

seized on or about September 16, 1985, and all other evidence
derived from such seizure pursuant to Section 77-35-12 of the
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure in that such search and seizure
was in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State
Constitution.
III.

Based upon the evidence introduced at the non-jury

trial, was the evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict of
guilty of the charge of production of a controlled substance in
violation of Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) U. C. A. (1953), as amended.

The Defendant was charged pursuant to Count I of the
1

Information with unlawful production of a controlled substance, a
third degree felony, in violation of §58-37-8(1)(a)(i), U. C. A.
(1953), as amended, and pursuant to Count II of the Information
with possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony,
in violation of §58-37-8(2)(a)(i), D. C. A. (1953), as amended.
After a non-jury trial held on January 16, 1986, before the
Honorable George E. Ballif, Judge, presiding, the defendant was
found guilty of Count I of the Information and the defendant was
further found not guilty as to Count II of the Information.
The sentence of the defendant was reduced to an alternative
normally applicable to the offense of a class A misdemeanor and
judgement and conviction for a class A misdemeanor offense was
imposed and the defendant was sentenced accordingly on the 7th day
of February, 1986.

The defendant's sentence was suspended and he

was placed on probation and ordered to serve two days in the Utah
County Jail as a condition of his probation.
The defendant's motion for the issuance of a certificate of
probable cause and stay of sentence was granted and the defendant
was released on his own recognizance pending appeal of this matter
(R. 112).

The defendant, Allan R. Watts, and his wife, Debbie Watts, were
charged pursuant to Informations filed on the 17th day of
September, 1985, charging them with two third degree felonies
occuring on or about September 16, 1985, to wit:

Count I:

Unlawful Production of a Controlled Substance in violation of
2

Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(i), D. C. A. (1953) , as amended and Count
II: Possession of a Controlled Substance in violaton of Section
58-37-8(2)(a)(i), U. C. A. (1953), as amended (R. 5, R. 9).
The defendants, Allan R. Watts and Debbie Watts, filed a motion
to Supress in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County,
State of Utah, on the basis that all marijuana seized on or about
September 16, 1985, and all derivative evidence was seized
illegally pursuant to Section 77-35-12 of the Utah Code of
Criminal Procedure in that such search and seizure was in
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and were in violation of Article 1, Section
14 of the Utah State Constitution (R. 16)•
A hearing was held before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen,
Judge pro-tern on the 15th day of November, 1985, on the
defendants motion to suppress (R. 122).
On September 16, 1985, at 11:00 a.m. Dectective Brad Latham
received information from a confidential informant regarding a
location of some marijuana plants in a greenhouse behind the
residence occupied by the defendants (R. 131-132).
In exchange for the information that the confidential
informant supplied to the Provo City Police, the confidential
informant was to have a criminal charge or charges dismissed
against him (R. 133-134).
The Provo City Police did not tell the confidential informant
directly which person or persons he or she was to gather data on
but only that such confidential informant was told to gain data
3

on a prosecutable charge (R. 134-135).
After the confidential informant notified the police at 11:00
a.m. on the 16th day of September/ 1985f the confidential
informant took the Provo City Police to the house that the
defendants occupied (R. 135)
The Provo City Police Officers did not enter onto the
property at that time but simply observed the make-shift
greenhouse from several different directions (R. 135).
The Provo City Police Department did not tell the
confidential informant that he could trespass or travel on
person's property or do anything that might be contrary to law in
order to obtain criminal evidence nor did they give him any
direction as to what he could or could not do in obtaining evidence
(R. 136).
The defendants were called to the stand pursuant to Rule 104
of the Utah Rules of Evidence pertaining to questions of
admissability of evidence (R. 138-139, 124).
According to the Police Report, the confidental informant
gained his information on the morning of the 16th and the
Plaintiff and the Defendant were aware of such fact (R. 151). At
any rate, both defendants testified that they did not give .any
person permission to be on their premises during the 24 hour
period stated in the Affidavit (R. 8) from 3:15 p.m. Sunday,
September 15, 1985 through 3:15 p.m. Monday, September 16, 1985,
when the search warrant was executed in front of the Circuit
Court Judge. (R. 140-143, R. 124, R. 151).
4

Artoidinq I* I he /ffidavil

in >upj.oit

I" issuance oi search

warrant, the confidential informant had proved his reliability to
the Provo City Police Department within the past 3t days and
within the last «. I I tu

hd<l 1 eivtU tl I a l 4 large plants

being grown JJI a makeshift greenhouse located behind a residence
at ! Hi foutl

Ui West, Pi »vo.

(R. 8).

Officer Latham testified that the confidential informant saw
the marijuana and that the marijuana could not be seen
from the road M I <l I I I IK L I i H P K M V I IK II n i luana from

l { L

road (R. 137), Additionally the makeshift greenhouse
contain* tl f w< rooms divided by two separate doors and the
marijuana was not open to public view or exposure (P. 167-1 "0).
See also Plaintiff's Exhibit #5 (R. 121). The marijuana that was
growing wd

ii (In

e< und H mn * r serond section UK 1681, Tl*

make-shift shed had two doors on such shed (R. 166, R. 3 69),
It is clear from the foregoing facts that the confidential
informant was in fact trespassing# and at an

tatv

the (obit said

as much on the Record (R. 145). At any rate, the prosecution
never

introduced uv

w i II-MITC- It r e1 u t € tht defendants' statement

that the confidential informant was >n f lien property without the
defendants1 consent and therefore was illegally trespassing on
their f i o^ei t^ .
The Honorable Allen B. Sorensen ruled that on the record
before him there was insufficient evidence to indicate the
informant and the Police Department were operating under an
5

agency relationship which would constitute the informant in fact
functioned as a police agent exercising police power.

The Court

further found that nothing was seized, but that something was
observed, according to the affidavit of the Officer Latham (R.
152).

See also Appendix A of the Court1s Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 22).
Even though the Court directed the prosecution to draft the
Findings of Facts and serve them on defense counsel (R. 152), the
prosecution did not do so (R. 22) and the Court refused to amend
its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law after notified by
the defendants of their objections to such Findings of Facts and
Conclusions of Law and Order. (R. 37).
Thomas H. Means filed his entry of appearance as attorney of
record for the Defendant, Debbie Watts on the 3rd day of
December, 1985 (R. 31).

Additionally, Debbie Watts, by and

through her attorney of record, Thomas H. Means, moved to have
the trial of his client, Debbie Watts, severed and heard
separately from the Defendant Allan R. Watts (R. 34) and such
motion to sever was granted on December 13, 1985 (R. 159-160).
Trial in this matter was held on January 16, 1986 in an
non-jury trial before the Honorable George E. Ballif, Judge in
the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah
(R. 157).
On the 16th day of September, 1985, Tim Meyer executed a
search warrant (R. 163-164).

Officer Meyer drew a diagram of a

residence and a makeshift shed listed as Plaintifffs exhibit #5
(R. 121).
6

Office! fievtM

injjoaleii I licit t IK

a three sided fence (R. 165),

J evidence was surrounded by

Officer Meyer located three

marijuana plants growing in i-':ir second section of the makeshift
greenhouse (R. ] 6 B, IR. J 8 9,
The evidence indicated that someone had been producing and
growing roa i i ]ii«in«i in I he struriiirp M-1. ' *<))•

Also, the

makeshift greenhouse was located behind the residence of 1498
South 500 West, Provo, Utah (R. 170).
Defense counse1 objected to a11 J tems sei zed or resu11i ng
from the search (R

1 71-1 7

Officer Meyer indicated that the distance between the house
and the makeshift greenhouse was approximately 50 feet (R.
177).
Office! Latham testified that the Defendant Allan R. Watts 1
name was listed in the telephone book, and that during the
booking procedure he listed his name and address as 1498 South
500 West, Provo, Utah (R. 179).

See also Findings of Facts

hereto attached as Appendix B (R. 88).
The dwe.l ] i i"uj

IJIICU

nt t lie above- referred to address was

described as a single family dwelling (R. 181).
Officer Latham testified that the Defendant occupied the
single family dwelling along with his wi fe, Debbi e Watts and
their children (R. 1 81-182),
The Court made specific Findings of Fact in support of its
guilty verdict.

See Appendix E (R. 88) .

The defendant objected upon the basis it was resulted from an
7

illegal search and seizure (R. 171, R. 192-195).

The Court found

the defendant guilty as to Count I of the Information and not
guilty as to Count II of the Information (R. 219)*

The trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting the
marijuana seized on or about September 16, 1985, together with all
evidence derived from such seizure and such evidence should have
been suppressed pursuant to Section 77-35-12 of the Utah Code of
Criminal Procedure in that such search and seizure was in
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Consititution and was in violation of Article I, Section
14 of the Utah State Constitution.
The verdict of the trial court should be reversed in that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain the charge against the
defendant, Allan R. Watts, that he did unlawfully produce a
controlled substance, to wit:

Marijuana*

8

hmMM
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING THE MARIJUANA AND ALL
DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE SEIZED ON OR ABOUT SEPTEMBER 16, 1985,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 77-35-12 OF THE UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IN THE SUCH SEARCH AND SEIZURE WAS IN VIOLATION
OF THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION
It is well settled by Biy&SaaJfcUB£££S§IL'

256 u

- s-

465

(1921) that the Fourth Amendment is a limitation upon the federal
government as we]] as state governments only, and that
consequently, evidence secured by private illegal searches need
not be excluded from a criminal trial.
On the other hand, "Quite clearly, a search is not private in
nature if it has been ordered or requested by a government
official."

Wayne R. LaFavee, Searches and Seizures, Section

1.6(b) (1978).
It is clear from the foregoing record that the confidential
informant was an agent of the police and was not acting in a
I'- '

•

^ S ^ « X ^ i ^ i i ^ ^ £ ^ e £ I 6 3 A.2d 337 (DC. App.

I960); SJ^te,..V,»-.Bgfii1Ch 13 Or. App. 415, 509 P.2d 1232 (1973).
The search by the confidential informant was clearly in joint
operation with the Provo City Police, and therefore, illegal,
§,%S^M2IL^^a§M&^iS^^m^L

70

Cal. 2d 97, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575,

447 P. 2d 967 (1968).
As stated earlier private conduct is brought within the
inhibitions of the Fourth Amendment if it has been ordered or
requested by a government official by asking the private party to
9

make a search or by accompanying the party to make the search
367

&UaO£^
£&s&££ 2 2 3

F

-

Su

PP

544

(DN

F

-

2d

1

(9th

Cir. 1966); fi£§g£L2^

J 1963), afffd per curiam 332 F.2d 794

(3rd Cir. (1964).
Officer Brad leatham testified that a confidential informant
had told the police that he had observed three or four marijuana
plants on the morning of September 16, 1985, growing in a
makeshift type greenhouse at the address of 1498 South 500 West/
Provo, Utah.
According to the Affidavit in Support of Issuance of a Search
Warrant, the confidential informant had given the Provo Police
reliable information on at least one previous occasion in the
past.
Officer Leatham testified at the Suppression Hearing that the
confidential informant was supplying the information to the Provo
City Police Department in return for having criminal charges
dismissed against such confidential informant.
Upon the information received from the above-referred to
confidential informant, the Provo City Police went to the address
of 1498 South 500 West, Provo, Utah, with the confidential
informant who pointed out the shed after which the police secured
a search warrant and seized growing marijuana plants as well as
other marijuana plants which they later observed and which had
been pulled and were no longer growing from the makeshift shed.
At no time did the confidential informant nor any other
person have permission to enter into the shed or onto the
premises of the defendant and such confidential informant was

trespassing and any information he obtained was done so
illegal! I y.
In addition to the cases previously cited/ the evidence
should have been suppressed in accordance with the following
cases.

In the case of ^A&feft«§A^egaXgi^fl^jR/ 551 F.2d 767

(1977) , the Court noted:
The search and seizure of property by a private individual
without any governmental involvement is not subject to the
dictates of the exclusionary rule«..a two pronged analysis
of allegedly private searches, however, separately analyzes
the search aspect apart from the actual seizure in order to
determine whether there was sufficient governmental participation in either aspect to require Fourth Amendment
protection. • .Thus, as in Sfcjy^4& an(^ I&LL& when the search
was held to be a private search/ the inquiry then focused on
the nature of the seizure and whether it passed constitutional muster. In this case, though the police obtained a
warrant prior to §jy,&JS£ (Emphasis in original) the films,
our inquiry into the nature of the search is not obviated
...It has been held that where a search is physically
conducted by a private individual but only at the
governments initiation and under their guidance it is not
a private search...Searches not so clearly governmental,
however/ must be judged according to the nature of the
governmental participation In the search process.
The case of

ffia£fcfiiL£^

539 F

-2d 1

(9th

Circuit/ 1976) gives some guidance in determining when there is a
private search.

As noted in gfe§£KA&:

In defining a private search/ the Supreme Court has stated
that the Fourth Amendment applies only if a private party,
in light of all the circumstances of the case, must be
regarded as having acted as an instrument or agent of the
state...Application of this definition/ will frequently/
require a careful factual analysis. However, there is
little difficulty in holding the Fourth Amendment
inapplicable to the incident case because prior or contemporaneous government involvement in the search was
totally absent...There must be some degree of governmental
knowledge in acquiesence. In the absence of such
governmental involvement/ a search is not governmental.
According t o f o o t n o t e number 5 of t h e §feg£V£JaQi. c a s e :
11

The incident case is relatively simple becuase of the
total absence of governmental involvement prior to the
completion of the search. Equally clear is the situation where governmental involvement in a search is so
pervasive that it is no longer even nominal private;
the Fourth Amendment is applicable to such a fjoint
venture1 because of the intrusive actions of the
officials therein...
In gray areas between the two clear situations, search
may be regarded as a private even though there has been
some governmental involvement prior to the completion...
In other cases the actions of private persons may be
attributed to the government/ as when officers acquiesce
in the unlawful or outrageous conduct of a private
person acting solely for a law enforcement purpose...In
determining whether the Fourth Amendment applies to a
nominally private search/ the ultimate test — "instrument
or agents of the state1 — is similar to that used in the
1
silver platter1 cases to decide whether the Fourth
Amendment was applicable to searches conducted .by state
officers. However/ the factors leading to the ultimate
conclusion have been treated somewhat differently in two
contexts...(Fourth amendment applies if there is some
federal involvement)...(Fourth Amendment applies even
without federal involvement/ if sole motive of state
officers is to enforce federal statute). Thus, we do
not believe the governmental distinction has been
regarded in the same light as the former federal/state
distinction. Although the total absence of the
governmental involvement makes it unnecessary to rely
on this additional factor/ we observe that the terminal
managerfs motive was not solely to serve the purposes of
the government.
Also see Skafafi^&^J&Ohaxmop, 596 P.2d 190 (Kansas 1979)
wherein as stated:
In order to be admissible/ evidence obtained through a
search by a private individual must come to the state
upon a 'silver platter1 not as a result of any instigation
by state officials or participation by them in illegal
activities...The extent of official involvement in the
total enterprise is the crucial element/ for if it is
too great the private individuals role may be reduced
to that of an agent...Once an agency relationship is
established/ the full panopoly of constitutional
provisions and curative measures applies/ and any evidence
which the police could not legally seize or observe is
also off limits to the agent.
The case of Sfe^^L^§A=JflYfltfiB* 574 P. 2d 1330 (Hawaii 1978)

12

dealt witili a factual situation very similar to ours wherein a
confidential informant provided information from time to time in
return for occasional financial reward as determined by the police.
As wilh tin.-. «:.ii.>i" i 't should O I M

iu

[MIIHIHI

uut that in the

gff^flj^ftQ case# the confidential informant also did not seize the
marijuana but merely performed a seach by using a ladder to go on
the property and see the contraband.

Additionally, the officer

later accompanied the confidential informant

the fence,

however, t;hf» officer c:i:i d iml |>oisona]] y c I

• ! - 1 adder or see

the contraband prior to obtaining the search warrant as were also
the facts in this case.
As noted in the aejj&fcgfl. case:
A subsequent search even under warrant based upon the
evidence obtained in the former tainted search is also
tainted. ^^li^^^.Mfc.gSMm/ 48 Haw. 204, 397 P. 2d
371 u s
558 (1964); see HfflUUSWLJ^^
- 471, 88 S. Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed 2d 441 (1963). Evidence
seized in a tainted search is subject to a motion to
suppress if it is to be used in a criminal prosecution.
n$WrM^Mm*
367 U.S. 643, 81 8, Ct. 3 684, 6 L.Ed.
2d 1081* "(1961) .
We stated earlier this term in ^^£&^MJ&]{£&£>
58
Haw. 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977), that a govermental
intrusion into matters in which an individual possesses a "reasonable expectation of privacy" is a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. J^SS^ESLL
3 & i ^ d § ^ t £ £ , 389 U. S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.
2d 576 (1967) .
Our task in the instant case is to determine whether
the informant search of the enclosed area was a private
search or a governmental search. It has been held that
where a search is physically conducted by a private
individual but only at government's initiation and
under their guidance it is not a private search...
Further that where civilians fact as agents of the
police...the full panoply of constitutional provisions and curative measures apply1...We must, however,
decide that searches not so clearly governmental be
based according to the extent of the governmental

participation involved. We hesitate in stating a
definitive rule as to what elements would constitute
an agency relationship between a confidential informant
and the police. In defining a private search/ the
Supreme Court has stated that the Fourth Amendment
applies only if a private party, fin light of all the
circumstances of the case, must be regarded as having
acted as an instrument or agent of the state1...
The most prominent indication of such a relationship is
the officer's admission at the motion to suppress hearing
that he actively recruited the informant...The issue of
whether the officer specifically directed the informant
to search the Appelles1 residence is irrelevant because
the informant was a governmental agent for Fourth
Amendment purposes. The informant herein does not seem
to have had a reason for being at the Appelles1 residence or for searching the area enclosed by the fence
which is not inexorably linked to police concerns. The
officers trip with the informant to the premises for
the purpose of verifying the information used by this
officer in his affidavit especially in light of the
prior recruitment seems to us to be strong evidence of
the informants symbiotic relationship with the officer...
Moreover, payment made by the government to the informant
may be considered with the other surrounding circumstances to determine if an informant was acting as an
instrument of the government or if his search must be
deemed governmental...
We distinguished this case from those situations where
the informant not having been previously recruited and
upon his own initiative approaches the police with information independently but perhaps illegally obtained,
where the requirements of the Fourth Amendment would
not apply. Such an informant typified as the 'little
old lady next door1 would be classified ordinarily as a
citizen informant, rather than a professional or semiprofessional police informant, who is the experienced
stool pigeon...
This is not to say that we do not appreciate the use of
informants in crime detection...Because it is the duty
of the Court to be watchful for the constitutional rights
of the citizens, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon,...we cannot condone the use by the state of
information illegally obtained by a semi-professional
police informant whose sole purpose in this kind of
endeavor is to gather data to be used in criminal
prosecutions.
Reversing the lower court's orders would indicate to
police informants that they shall be paid rather than
1 A

punished for breaching the law. We fear that our
failure to disapprove the use of information known to
have been obtained in breach of the law by recruited
police informants would tempt the police to use persons
unaffected by the Fourth Amendment restriction to
obtain evidence which they cannot directly obtain.
Constitutional limitations on governmental action
would be severely undercut if the government
were
allowed to actively encourage conduct by f private 1
persons or entities1 that is prohibited to the
government itself.
HflJAsfiJ^
supra
482 F.2d at 904. We cannot allow the constitutional
prohibition to be circumvented in this manner.
In the present ease, the only differ ence between oi :ii: case and
the afore-mentioned cases may be said that the confidential informant has had at 1! east two felony charges dismissed against him or
her in return for the information supplied rather than receiving
direct monetary compensation.
It can e.it-1v.

*

.

the Donf:i dential informant

received for his information was worth far more than the payment
of money to him by the Provo City Police, that is* he or she
completely avoided the possibility of any jail or prison or any
fine, or ari

crimininal record of any kind.
, there w a s a n I ] J e g a 3 s <= • a r c h b y a j: o I i c e a g e n t

prior to the issuance o f the search w a r r a n t .

T h e r e f o r e , the

search warrant w a s secured by illegally obtained evidence and t h e
marijuana and uLJiet <;iv icfenco must b^> suppressed as resultii: ig from
an illegal search and seizure J t e B S L ^ ^ ^
D. S. 471 (1963).
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING THE MARIJUANA AND ALL
DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE SEIZED ON OR ABOUT SEPTEMBER 16, 1985,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 77-35-12 OF TEE UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IN THAT SUCH SEARCH AND SEIZURE WAS IN VIOLATION
OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION.
The wording of Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of
Utah is identical to the wording of the Fourth Amendment to the
U. S. Constitution with the exception that Article I, Section
14 of the Utah Constitution replaces a semi-colon for a comma
after the word "violated" in the Utah Constitution.
This of course does not necessarily imply that the meaning
of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution is identical to
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution.
The question then becomes whether citizens of Utah have any
greater protection from "unreasonable searches and seizures" than
do citizens of other states of the Union.
(nc

The case of ^£&iJi£^J^l]9&L&'

parallel Utah cite), 581

P.2d 991 (1972) involved a self help situation wherein the victim
went to the defendant's apartment without permission and recorded
serial numbers which such victim then turned over to the police.
The police secured a search warrant based upon such information
and the Utah Court infi§x&ikL3quoted ^JiSSSSU^
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U. S. 465 (1921) and stated that the Fourth Amendment of the U.
S. Constitution was only a restraint upon government officers and
their agents.
Justice Crockett in the &%fffeg.jkfl case stated in his opinion
which concurred in result that "We need not go beyond that as to
whether under some circumstances there may be an 'unreasonable
16

search 1 by o t h e r s than governmental o f f i c e r s * 1

See Utah

C o n s t i t u t i o n , A r t i c l e I , Section 14• w
A r t i c l e I , Section 14 of the Utah c o n s t i t u t i o n was passed in
i t s o r i g i n a l proposed form and without amendment or comment by
order of the Convention dated May 8, 1895.

fi&j&ak'

Pa9e
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§^MU&i&L3£££JL%&

-

Article IIIr Section 7 of the 1889 Constitution of Montana was
comparable to Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and
read:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers,
homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and
seizures, and no warrant to search any place or seize
any person or thing shall issue without describing the
place to be searched, or the person or thing to be
seized, nor without probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, reduced to writing.
In the case of gfcftt^yftfr,JB&SS*Mi*

485

P-2d

47

(Montana 1971) a

sister-in-law overheard a threat on an extension telephone to
which she later testified in court.

The Montana Court reversed

the Second Degree murder charge stating:
Admission of this testimony violated the defendants Fourth
Amendment rights under the federal constitution as applied
to state court criminal proceedings under the fdue process1
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It equally violated
defendant's rights under Article III, Section 7 of the
Montana Constitution.
gflte.Jffi^tJ^AL^.^^1y8,6# 389 U. S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19
L. Ed2d 576 established the principle that the "search
and seizure" provisions of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution protects persons and their
right to privacy and is not confined to trespass against
property rights. S&feSL also established that Fourth
Amendment violations also offend Fifth Amendment guarantees against self-incrimination...
17

The state admits this, but contends the protection is
afforded only against violations by law enforcement
officers and not against violations by private citizens.
We think not. The violation of the constitutional right
to privacy and against compulsory self-incrimination is
as detrimental to the person to whom the protection is
guaranteed in the one case as in the other. To distinguish between classes of violators is tantamount to
desruction of the right itself. This Court in 1952, in
a civil case not involving state or federal governmental
agents or activity, recognized this principle in the
following passage fromff^,§fcMry^j£gfcffi/125 Mont. 517,
523, 524, 241 P.2d 816, 819:
"Continuing the article announces: fThe common
law has always recognized a man's house as his
castle, impregnable, often, even to its own
officers engaged in the execution of its
commands.11
"The right of privacy is embraced within the
absolute rights of personal security and
personal liberty."

(Emphasis in original))
This Court in the present case would be remiss were it not
to recognize that evidence obtained by the unlawful or
unreasonable invasion of several of the constitutionally
protected rights guaranteed to its citizens by both the
federal and Montana constitutions properly comes within
contemplation of this Court's exclusionary rule. To do
otherwise would lend Court approval to a fictional
distinction between classes of citizens: those who are
bound to respect the Constitution and those who are not.
Were the exclusionary rule to recognize such distinctions
it would by indirection circumvent the rule established
by this Court to enforce these rights and would in fact
render the rule and the constitutional guarantees it
protects meaningless.
A new Montana State Constitution was ratified by its citizens
June 6, 1972.
The 1972 Montana Constitution provided in Article II, Section
and 11 as follows:
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Section 10. Right of privacy. The right of individual
privacy is essential to the wellbeing of a free society
and shall not be infringed without the showing of a
compelling state interest*
Section 11, Searches and Seizures. The people shall
be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects
from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant
to search any place, or seize any person or thing shall
issue without describing the place to be searched or the
person or thing to be seized, or without probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing.
The Montana Constitution therefore expanded on the concept of
right to privacy in its Constitution of 1972.
The case of ^fl^ a i5fi^4^ttrAft

530

p

-2d

442

(Montana 1974)

involved a manager of a McDonald f s Restaurant who turned over
marijuana to the police which was in the possession of one of
his employees.
The Court in Gpfol^Q quoted extensively from the case of
6&S£feitfl

and

additionally noted certain statutory exceptions to the

requirements of a search warrant.

It is worth noting that Utah

does not have statutory exceptions to search warrants as is the
case in Montana.
The Court in Qohiujl

stated:

Also, the federal constitution contains no specific section
establishing a separate and independent right of privacy as
does the 1972 Montana Constitution. The United States
Constitution recognizes the right as part of the First,
Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments...
So far as privacy is concerned gj|£& recognized the Fourth
Amendment was not a general right of privacy but the right
was contained in the Fourth and several other amendments,
the First, Third and the Fifth, and as stated in &ya& at
p. 350 of 389 U. S. at p. 511 of 88 S. Ct. at p. 581 of
19 L.Ed.2d in reference to the right of privacy:
...his right to be let alone by other pople — is like the
protection of his property and of his very life, left
largely to the law of the individual States...
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Concerning the exclusionary rule itself it would be weir
to consider first that the "exclusionary rule" is a court
adopted rule resting on the "rule making" and supervisory
power of the Supreme Court over the other courts and has
no roots in the constitution or the statutes of the state
or federal government...
The facts that the rule is characterized as not satisfactory
and the state in argument recommended that a tort remedy for
the aggrieved was adequate, simply ignores that all of the
cases which declare the rule as a deterrent because the
wrong cannot be corrected or compensated, but merely
avoided in the future, must have recognized that there
could be no price placed on a constitutional right...
In

§!&£&&'

the

court said:

"The exclusionary rule has for decades been the subject
of ardent controversy. The arguments of its antagonists
and of its proponents have been so many times marshalled
as to require no lengthy elaboration here."
It is, however, noteworthy to comment on its application
and the "silver platter doctrine1 that resulted. The
first application of the rule, in 1914, applied only to
the federal court system and only excluded tainted
evidence obtained by federal officers and as a result
the so-called "silver platter doctrine" was developed,
i.e. state officers could violate a person's constitutional right and hand the evidence to the federal
officers (on a silver platter) and such evidence could
be used in the federal court because no federal officer
was physically involved in the violation.
This practice was recognized but ignored for over 40
years until filJyt£&. In that case, the "silver platter
doctrine" was finally discredited. SJiyJlgL went on to
observe that it is unlikely factual data could be
assembled to demonstrate that the exclusionary rule
was unworkable and in some depth demonstrated the
opposite conclusion. Of more interest, Elkins cites
with approval as a ground for rejecting the so-called0
"silver platter doctrine":
But there is another consideration—the imperative of
judicial integrity...fPor those who agree with me,1
said Mr. Justice Holmes, fno distinction can be taken
between the Goverment as prosecutor and the Government
as judge.1 277 D. S. at page 470, 48 S.Ct. at page
575. (Dissenting opinion.) fIn a goverment of laws,1
said Mr. Justice Erandeis, fexistence of the government
will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law
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scrupulously. Our Government is the potent/ the
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches
the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious.
If the goverment becomes a law-breaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a
law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare
that in the administration of the criminal law the
end justifies the means — to declare that the
government may commit crimes in order to secure the
conviction of a private criminal — would bring
terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine
this court should resolutely set its face...
The argument that the exclusionary rule is wedded to
the sovereign because the organized officialdom are
the only ones that can be deterred because the injury
to the victim cannot be restored or reparation comes
too late, and that all others would have no prosecution
motive and could not be familiar with the rule is an
unwarranted generalization that completely disregards
the changes that have taken place in our political
and social structure and the legal impact of the cases
on the subject since the rule was announced in
frUEflfiftft in 1921...
Finally, it fails altoghether to recognize the massive
increase in the incidents of the invasions of the right
of privacy of the private citizen or the scientific
advances that have made this possible, even though the
United States congress has finally recognized the
problem and has given it priority consideration.
Further, the arguments erroneously characterize the
"private person11 as the little old lady next door who
has a desire to assist in law enforcement. When in
fact a great many of the pure Fourth Amendment cases
cited by the state involve "institutional", "quasi"
or "private" police, i.e., airport guards, building
security personnel, private detectives and we also
have private corporation police like railroad police
and self-help groups and investigators for political
committees. Experience simply does not cast these
groups of "private" persons in the minority. The
standards agreed to by the state simply do not fit
this segment of the private sector. Methods designed
to protect the multiple rights of the whole of our
citizenry are not intended to free criminals or
discourage the participation of citizens in the
enforcement of our laws.
If one considers that any exclusionary process only
excludes "unreasonable" conduct it can readily be
seen that all intrusions are not unreasonable. Like
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it or not unreasonable or illegal intrusions knowingly accepted and used, from the private sector
by the government amount to an extension of the
silver platter doctrine condemned by BJJjJLfiyS'
particularly when viewed in the light of judicial
integrity emphasized in £ i M M * It: k a s b e ^n argued
that
fiiMai d i d n o t disturb fe££gg£U'it: m a Y n o t h a v e
been clear in the pure Fourth Amendment context/ but
a close examination does move one to believe that the
silver platter concept was condemned in any context.
The Utah Supreme Court recognized an individuals right to
privacy and the right to be left alone in &&g^J^^Ji&££&£,
P.2d 175 (Utah, 1983).
The Court in gg^J^g, noted:
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public
may be constitutionally protected. l^JLJJSUJBDJAaS.
SfcfltSftF 389 U. S. 347, 351, 88 S. Ct. "507, 511, 19 L.
Ed.2d 576, 582 (1967). Subsequent to the ggj^
decision much emphasis was given to the twofoLd
requirement advanced in the concurring opinion of
Harlan, J. at 389 U. S. 361, 88 St. Ct. 516, 19 L.
Ed2d 588 that the defendant must have a subjective
expectation of privacy and that society is prepared
to recognize that expectation as reasonable...
What re-emerges, consistent with &§£&/ is the maxim
of Justice Erandeis1 QiffiiifeBflfl. dissent which foreshadowed the precept that government protects people,
not places:
[The makers of our Constitution] conferred, as against
the government, the right to be left alone — the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy
of the individual, whatever the means employed, must
be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment...
There are of course justifiable intrusions when the
right to be let alone must yield to the right of
333 u
search. aSOfflfiSUSUE^^
- s- 1 0 '
68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948), but as a rule
that justification must be sanctioned by a judicial
officer and not asserted in the discretion of a
government official because "searches conducted
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outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only
to a few specifically established and well delinated
exceptions-n gft^ n ft^a 3 8 9 D- s- a t 3 5 7 ' 8 8 s- ctat 514, 19 L.Ed2d at 585. And the burden is on
those seeking exemption to show the need* & ^ M & & '
The intervention of a neutral magistrate not only
guarantees a lawful search of a suspected offender,
but in a large sense it protects society against
the erosion of those cherished rights that are
still not taken for granted in many parts of the
world. Courts do not enforce these procedural
requirements to sanction the activities of one
single individual, but to assure all citizens
those continuing fundamental rights...
Inasmuch as the intiial search and seizure was
illegal, all subsequent contraband was "come at by the
exploitation of that illegality" and may not be used
against the defendant. JBfflaJS^^^
371 U. S. 471, 88 S. Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed2d 441 (1963);
&9^3L&t*M&i

367u

2d 1081 (1961).

- s - 6 4 3 '8 1 s - ct -
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Finally, the case of g j ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ l i ^ ^

6 L

600

-Ed-

*-2d 816

(Montana 1979) involves as close a situation as can be imagined
which could be characterized as the "little old lady next door
who desires to assist in law enforcement."
In the case of g^fjJlsil/ a neighbor illegally trespassed on
the defendant's property and took a sample of what turned out to
be marijuana after the police had failed to see any marijuana
which had been previously reported by the neighbor.
The Court in ggj^&igk stated:
The framers of the 1972 Constitution indicated the right
of individual privacy was significant whatever the source
of the invasion. The delegate who introduced the proposed
privacy section reflected these concerns:
...Certainly, back in 1776, 1789 when they
developed our bill of rights the search and f
seizure provisions were enough, when a raan s
23

home was his castle and the state could not
intrude upon this home without the procuring
of a search warrant with probable cause being
stated before a magistrate and a search
warrant being issued. No other protection
was necessary and this certainly was the
greatest amount of protection that any free
society has given its individuals. In that
type of a society, of course, the neighbor
was maybe three or four miles away. There
was no real infringement upon the individual
and his right of privacy. However, today we
have observed an increasingly complex society
and we know our area of privacy has decreased
decreased and decreased..." Tr. of the Montana
Constitutional Convention, Vol. VII, pp. 5180-81.
Later in the same statement, the scope of the delegates1
concern was addressed:
"...It isn't only a careless government that has
this power to pry, political organizations, private
information gathering firms, and even an individual
can now snoop more easily and more effectively than
ever before..." Tr. at p. 5182.
A search and seizure such as the one executed by Mrs.
Arnold amounts to a significant invasion of individual
privacy...
Because the search of the Helfrich property was based
upon the fruit of an unlawful trespass, the District Court
acted properly in suppressing the evidence and granting
the defendant's motion to dismiss.
In the present case under consideration, the Provo City
Police are attempting to do indirectly what they cannot do
directly.

The mere fact that the police gave the confidential

informant no direction as to what he could or could not do
legally shows a gross lack of concern for citizens constitutional
rights.

The only testimony before the court is that the confid-

ential informant was on the defendant's property without his
permission, i.e., trespassing.

Additionally, the transcript

appears to show that not only were the police not concerned with
how the information was gathered, but that in fact the police
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never even asked.
To say the least/ it seems abundantly clear that there was an
unreasonable search by the confidential informant prior to the
issuance of the warrant/ and therefore/ there was an unreasonable
search and seizure which requires the suppression of all evidence
seized.

Article I# Section 14 of the Utah Constitution protects

against "unreasonable searches" regardless of whom performs such
search.

No language in the Utah Constitution suggests that

illegal searches by private persons are permissible anymore than
governmental searches are.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE GUILTY VERDICT
OF UNLAWFUL PRODUCTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
The only evidence that was introduced at the trial could
allow at most the trial court to infer the defendant/ Allan R.
Watts/ and the co-defendant/ Debbie Watts occupied a dwelling at
1498 South 500 West/ ProvO/ Utah/ and that marijuana was being
cultivated or produced in a make shift greenhouse not exposed to
public view some fifty feet away by someone.
Indeed the prosecutor stated "We don't know who grew them.
We could not begin to carryr beyond a reasonable doubt/ a burden
to show that both plants were grown by this defendant (R. 212).
The prosecution's states several times that the marijuana
was cultivated by someone/ but the state never proved beyond a
reasonable doubt who that someone was (R. 214-217).
While the defendant doesnft assert the statefs commenting on
the defendant's failure to testify as error in this non-jury
25

trial (although he probably should), it is clear the state was
attempting to shift the burden to the defendant to prove he was
not guilty (R. 212, R. 216-217).
The case of &%§^JiM^£<&m£>

30 U.2d 125, 514 P.2d 793,

(Utah/ 1973) set forth the necessary proof the state is required
to show unlawful production of a controlled substance beyond a
reasonable doubt.

In the £&&£&££ case an individual discovered

in one of his fields that someone was cultivating two small
patches of plants which he suspected were marijuana.

He

contacted the local authorities who made an examination of the
area.

The plants were growing on high grounds and were not

watered by irrigation.

Depressions were found adjacent to the

plants and the grounds surrounding the plants was moist.

Buckets

and jugs were found near a creek which was a short distance from
the marijuana.
the creek.

Additionally/ foot prints led from the area to

After the police had put the area under surveillance/

they observed the defendant crossing over the field near the area
where the marijuana plant was growing and did further observe the
defendant picking leaves from one of the plants and placing it in
a plastic bag.

Additionally, the defendant made incriminating

statements. The Court in &gj?£Qfc£ noted, "the evidence taken
as a whole could only support a charge that the defendant was in
possession of marijuana.

Possession alone is insufficient to

show the defendant cultivated or produced the substance."
The concurring opinion written by Justice Eenriod in §£&£&££
stated that:
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The transcript is devoid of any evidence connecting the
defendant with tilling of the soil, planting, watering,
or fertilizing any marijuana plants, [and] should be
considered at least as an unorthodox but nonetheless
intended effort to apprise this Court as a matter
prejudicial in one degree or another to his interest,
based on the differential between improper accusation
and any attempt to correct it by so-called curative
instruction.
Therefore the State of Utah must show not only that the
defendant was in constructive possession of the marijuana but
must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he produced such
substance by proving that he did till the soil, was involved
in planting, watering or fertilizing the marijuana plants,
confessed to such activity or otherwise produced such marijuana
plants.

The state cannot merely infer the facts without more

as is indicated in §£&£2f£.
By following the states theory, the individual owner of the
property in the S9JU^££ case would have been guilty of unlawful
production of a controlled substance. (R. 216).
And it must constantly be remembered that all that can be
inferred from the evidence is that the defendant, Allan R. Watts,
and his codefendant, Debbie Watts, occupied the dwelling.

There

was no evidence to show they occupied or owned any surrounding
land nor any evidence connecting defendant with the marijuana in
the makeshift greenhouse.
And before unlawful production of a controlled substance can
be found, there must be a showing of at least constructive
possession as stated in §£&£&££•
As noted in &fca£fi^£»,.XQX.f 20 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, (Utah, 1985):
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Knowledge and ability to possess do not equal possession
where there is no evidence of intent to make use of the
knowledge and ability.
To find that a defendant had constructive possession of a
drug or other contraband, it is necessary to prove that
there was a sufficient nexus between the accused and the
drug to permit an inference that the accused had both the
power and intent to exercise dominion and control over the
drug • . .
Whether a sufficient nexus between the acused and the drug
exists depends on the facts and circumstances of each case
••.Ownership and/or occupancy of the premises upon which
the drugs are found, although important factors, are
not alone sufficient to establish constructive possession,
especially when occupancy is not exclusive. ^itj^JSkatfifl
ya^riR&%4g/ 562 Fed. 2d 681, 693 (D. C. Circuit 1977).
See also ^^L^Y^^M^^m^

*68 P-2d 1258 (Utah, 1983),

wherein it is stated in the concurring three-member majority
opinion of the Court reversing the trial Court that:
Lana Anderton's conviction on this charge was based solely
on her joint ownership of the residence in the home where
the drugs were found.
There is substantial support for the rule that where a
defendant is in non-exclusive possession or occupancy
of the premises on which controlled substance are found,
there must be some additional incriminating evidence to
establish guilt of possession: Proof of a proprietary
interest in or regular occupancy of a premises §^gag.
[emphasis in the original] is not sufficient to prove
constructive possession.
CONCLUSION
The District Court improperly admitted evidence as a result
of an illegal search and seizure and should have suppressed all
evidence seized on or about September 16, 1985, and all other
evidence derived therefrom, pursuant to Section 77-35-12 of the
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure in that such search and seizure
was in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and in violation of Article I, Section
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14 of the Dtah State Constitution.
Therefore, the trial Court's decision should be reversed with
instructions to suppress such evidence.
Additionally, the verdict of guilty should be reversed for
insufficient evidence to sustain the guilty verdict of Unlawful
Production of a Controlled Substance and the case should be
remanded for the purpose of discharging him.
Respectfully submitted this J^.^J^ day of May, 1986.

GREGOl®' ML^ WARNER
Attorney \£pr Appellant
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of
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ADDENDUM

APPENDIX A

NOALL T. WOOTTON
Utah County Attorney
Room 107, County Building
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 373-5510
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:
Plaintiff,

:

-vs-

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

:
CASE NO, 9911

ALLAN R. WATTS
DEBBIE WATTS,
Defendants,

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the
Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, District Court Judge, on the 25th
day of November, 1985, at the hour of 9:30 a.m.

The plaintiff

was represented by its attorney, Wayne B. Watson, Chief Deputy
County Attorney, and the defendants were ooth present ana
represented by their counsel, Gregory M. Warner, esq.

The court

having heard the evidence presented by the parties now rakes ana
enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The court finds that the residence of both defendants

located at 1498 South 500 West, Provo, Utah County, was searched
by Detective Bradle> S. Leatham of the Provo City Police
Department and other officers in assistance on September 16,
1985.

2.

The court finds that said search was conducted by

authority of a search ana seizure warrant issued by Judge E.
Patrick McGuire of the Eighth

Circuit Court of Provo Department,

Utah County, State of Utah, on September 16, 1985.
3.

The court finds that the affidavit in support of said

search warrant declared that a confidential informant within the
last 24 hours prior to execution of said affidavit observed on
the premises at least four large marijuana plants being grown in
a makeshift greenhouse on the property.
4.

The court finds that no evidence was presented which

would provide a basis for finding that the confidential informant
who was relied upon in the issuance of said search warrant was
acting as an agent for the police department nor that anything
was seized at the time of said confidential informant's initial
observation of the contraband.
Wherefore, having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact,
the court now makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The court concludes that the defendants' motion to

Suppress should be denied, there oeing no evioence presentee to
demonstrate agency on behalf of the confidential informant nor
any evidence presented that any items were seized by saia
confidential informant acting in his capacity as a representative
or agent of the law enforcement agency.

ORDER
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the Motion to Suppress of defendants is hereby denied.
Dated this

^""^ day of November, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

AtTLfeN B. SORENSEN, Judge
Fourth Judicial District
CERTIFICATE

OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order to Gregory M.
Warner, Attorney for Defendant, at P.Oi Box "L", Provo, Utah
84601, this -J "}
aay of November, 1^85.
/ ,

^_*—

Secretary /

APPENDIX B

NOALL T. WOOTTON
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
Room 107, County Building
Provo, Utah 84601
373-5510 Ext. 210
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNT
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

:
:

vs.

:

ALLAN R. WATTS,

:

Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Case No. 9911

:

This matter came before this Court for trial to the bench
on the 16th day of January, 1986.

The Court having heard the

testimony now enters the following findings of fact.
1.

The growing marijuana was located within a shed, half

of which had been converted into a rough greenhouse.
2.

The shed was located within the fenced yard of a single

family dwelling.
3.

The defendant and his spouse were the only residents

of that dwelling.
4.

The marijuana was under obvious cultivation, being

pruned, watered and tied to the ceiling of the portion of the
shed which had been lined with plastic.

5. Mo testimony placed any individuals other than the
defendant, his spouse and their minor children at the residence,
6.

The telephone to the residence is in the name of the

defendant.
7.

That the defendant had non-exclusive dominion or

control over the area where the marijuana was found.
DATED this

day of

, 1986.

BY THE COURT:

District Court Judge

APPROVED as to form:

-2-

